IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CENTRAL DIVISION
MIKE CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHERI TOALSON REISCH,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2:18-CV-04129-BCW

ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Cheri Toalson Reisch’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. #9). The
Court, being duly advised of the premises, denies said motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mike Campbell brings a 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 claim against Defendant, Missouri state
representative Cheri Toalson Reisch, alleging that Reish violated his First Amendment rights by
blocking him from commenting on her Twitter account. Campbell seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief.
Under the allegations of Campbell’s first amended complaint (Doc. #22),1 Reisch is a State
Representative for the 44th District of the Missouri House of Representatives. Reisch uses a social
media platform Twitter. Reisch has operated a Twitter account under the handle2 “@CheriMO44”
since September 2015 (“Account”). Her Twitter profile states: “Christian, MO State Rep 44th
District, Mother, Grandmother.”

1

The instant motion was filed in response to Campbell’s original complaint (Doc. #1), alleging claims against Reisch
in her individual and official capacities and seeks damages. Campbell’s amended complaint asserts claims against
Reisch solely in her official capacity and does not pray for damages. The amended complaint is otherwise identical to
the original complaint, and the parties agree that this motion may be decided on the basis of the amended complaint.
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A user handle is a unique account name, which consists of an @ symbol followed by a word or phrase (e.g.,
@RealDonaldTrump).
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Twitter is a social media platform owned and operated by Twitter, Inc., with more than 300
million active users worldwide. Twitter enables users to publish short messages to the general
public called “tweets,” to republish or respond to others’ tweets, and to interact with other users.
Twitter users may “follow” other Twitter users. A followed user’s tweets automatically appear in
the following user’s Twitter feed – a continually updating scroll of new tweets from other users.
A user may comment on other users’ tweets, or “retweet” their tweets to her own followers. Twitter
also enables its users to block particular users from following their tweets. A blocked user who
attempts to follow the blocking user will see a message informing the blocked user about the
blocking.
Campbell, a resident of Centralia, Missouri, is registered to vote in Missouri’s 44th district,
for which Reisch sits. Plaintiff is active on social media platforms, including Twitter, which he
uses to follow and comment on posts by various state officials, including Reisch. Campbell alleges
that Reisch uses her Account to address her constituents, tout her accomplishments as a state
representative, and promote her political agenda. Some examples of such tweets alleged in the
complaint include: (i) a May 18, 2018 retweet of a message from House Speaker Todd Richardson
with the comment, “Thank you Mr. Speaker, you are a true gentleman. We worked hard and got
the job done”; (ii) a May 23, 2018 tweet, “Great to have Governor @EricGreitens & Hallsville
Mayor at the NRA Bianchi Cup today”; (iii) a June 13, 2018 tweet, “Accomplished much in my
1st 2 years, ready for the next 2.” Reisch also uses the account to tweet about various subjects of
personal interest to her.
On June 22, 2018, Reisch tweeted about her appearance at a public event, at which her
political opponent in the November 6, 2018 general election, Maren Jones, also appeared. Resich
tweeted “Sad my opponent put her hands behind her back during the Pledge.” On June 23, 2018,
Representative Kip Kendrick criticized Reisch’s tweet by commenting, “Maren’s father was a
2
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Lieutenant in the Army. Two of her brothers served in the military. I don’t question [Maren’s]
patriotism. That’s a low blow and unacceptable from a member of the Boone County delegation.”
Campbell retweeted Kendrick’s criticism in Reisch’s Account. After this retweet, Reisch
permanently blocked Campbell from following or commenting on her Account.
Reisch also allegedly blocked dozens of other Twitter users from seeing or commenting on
her tweets, including many of her own constituents in the 44th House District.
Campbell claims that such blocking is an impermissible viewpoint-based restriction that
violates his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In the instant motion,
Reisch moves the Court to dismiss Campbell’s complaint for insufficient pleading under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
Reisch moves for dismissal of Campbell’s § 1983 claim, alleging that he failed to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, because he failed to properly allege sufficient factual
matter to plead both of the “under the color of state law” and the “deprivation” elements of the
claim. Campbell responds that his allegations as to both elements are adequate under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(b).
3
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A.

THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED.

To state a § 1983 claim, Campbell must plead that (1) “[he was] deprived of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” and (2) “the alleged deprivation was committed
under color of state law.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999).
1.

Campbell sufficiently alleged the deprivation element of his § 1983 claim.

The determination of whether Reisch deprived Campbell of his First Amendment free
speech right involves a three-step analysis: (1) whether the speech “is speech protected by the First
Amendment”; (2) “whether the putative forum is susceptible to forum analysis at all”; (3) the
forum’s classification. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788 (1985)) (other citations omitted).
The parties do not dispute that Campbell’s re-tweet constituted speech protected by the
First Amendment. Reisch contends, however, that dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is
appropriate because (i) the public forum analysis does not apply to Reisch’s Account, because
Twitter, is owned by a private company; and (ii) Campbell failed to sufficiently allege that any
part of Reisch’s Account is a designated public forum since her only interest in the Account is a
license to use that Twitter can revoke at any time and for any reason; (iii) Campbell has not been
excluded from the interactive space within Reisch’s Account, because he can still respond to other
users’ comments within the Account. Campbell responds that the public forum doctrine is
applicable to a private space, like a website, based on government control, and that by using her
Account to address and seek comment from her constituents on matters of public concern, Reisch
created a designated public forum. Campbell further asserts that whether he was actually excluded
from the interactive space is irrelevant for purposes of a motion to dismiss.
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a. The interactive space of the Defendant’s Account is susceptible to the forum analysis.
“For a space to be susceptible to forum analysis, it must be owned or controlled by the
government.” Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 565 (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801). “[T]he
application of forum doctrine must be consistent with the purpose, structure, and intended use of
the space.” Id. The space may be “a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic
sense.” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). It may
“lack[ ] a physical situs.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
Reisch’s argument relating to the inapplicability of the forum analysis to her Account,
relies on Morgan v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018). In Bevin, plaintiffs claimed that
Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin violated their First Amendment rights by blocking them from his
Facebook and Twitter pages. Id. at 1005. The Bevin court noted that “Governor Bevin’s Twitter
and Facebook accounts are privately owned channels of communication” that “are a means for
communicating his own speech, not for the speech of his constituents,” and that are “not converted
to public property by the use of a public official.” Id. at 1011. The Bevin court held that because
Governor Bevin uses privately owned Facebook and Twitter pages for his personal speech, to
speak on his own behalf, albeit as a public official, “the First Amendment strictures that attend the
various types of government-established forums do not apply.” Id. at 1010–11 (quoting Walker v.
Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015)).
In opposition, Campbell urges the Court to adopt the forum analysis in Knight, 302 F.
Supp. 3d at 574–75, in which the Southern District of New York addressed whether President
Trump’s blocking of plaintiffs from following or commenting on his Twitter account violated
plaintiffs’ free speech rights. The Knight court determined that there are 3 components within each
Twitter account: (i) the content of the tweets; (ii) the timeline comprised of those tweets and the
comment threads those tweets initiate; and (iii) the “interactive space” associated with each tweet,
5
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in which other users may directly interact with the content of the tweets. 302 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
The Knight court held the content of the tweets sent by Trump and “the account’s timeline, which
‘displays all tweets generated by the [account]’” are not subject to the forum analysis, because
these components represent government speech, which “is one category of speech that falls outside
the domain of forum analysis.” Id. at 571. However, the court further concluded that although
forum analysis does not apply to Trump’s Twitter account as a whole, it applies to “the interactive
space associated with each tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content of the
tweets.” Id. at 566. In so concluding, the Knight court noted that the President and his staff
exercised sufficient control over the account to satisfy the government-control requirement. Id. at
566.
The Court finds that the fact that Twitter is privately owned does not preclude a finding
that it is susceptible to the public doctrine analysis. The Supreme Court has held that “to evoke
First Amendment concerns,” “a speaker must seek access to public property or to private property
dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801
(emphasis added); see also Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat. Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
134 (1973) (“The First Amendment has also been held applicable where private parties control
essentially public forums.”).
Other courts that dealt with First Amendment violations in the context of social media
accounts and pages or their components, treated such accounts and pages as public spaces
susceptible to the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730,
1735 (2017) (comparing social media to traditional public fora such as parks and streets); Davison
v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. 2017) (“When one creates
a Facebook page, one generally opens a digital space for the exchange of ideas and information.”);
Davison v. Plowman, 2017 WL 105984, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2017) (“the Commonwealth’s
6
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Attorney’s Facebook page qualifies as a limited public forum for First Amendment purposes”)
(citation omitted); Price v. City of New York, 2018 WL 3117507, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2018)
(“the City’s official Twitter pages share many characteristics of public forums [. . .]”: Twitter is
“generally open to the public”; appears to be “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities”;
and appears to have “as a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas”).
Similarly, this Court believes that the public forum doctrine applies to Reisch’s Twitter
Account. In particular, the Court finds convincing the rationale in Knight that the interactive space
following each tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content of the tweets is
subject to forum analysis.
b. Forum classification is not necessary for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss.
Reisch next argues that she lacks the required ownership or control (i.e., some enforceable
property interest) over the Account to create a designated public forum, her only interest being a
revocable license to use Twitter services. Campbell insists that by using the Account to address
her constituents and inviting their replies in the interactive space, Reisch did create such a forum.
There are three types of public fora: traditional public fora, designated public fora, limited
public fora, and nonpublic fora. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469-70 (2009).
As stated above, courts that dealt with this issue, have classified social media pages (or
their components) differently. However, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, the Court need not
decide which type of forum was created, because “[r]egardless of whether it occurs in a public,
designated, or nonpublic forum, viewpoint discrimination that results in the intentional, targeted
expulsion of individuals from these forums violates the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.” Price, 2018 WL 3117507, at *16 (Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829); see also Davison
v. Randall, No. 17-2002, 2019 WL 114012, at *12 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019) (refusing to decide
7
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whether a Facebook page is a traditional or a designated public forum and stating that “viewpoint
discrimination” is “prohibited in all forums”).
c. Applicability of the forum analysis does not increase the risk of forum closure.
Reisch next argues, relying on Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. 460, that the Court should dismiss
Campbell’s complaint, because unblocking him from her Account risks forum closure. In Pleasant
Grove, a municipality denied a private religious group’s request to allow it to erect a “monument
in a city park in which other donated monuments were previously erected.” 555 U.S. at 464. The
plaintiff religious group sought relief under the First Amendment, arguing that the city park
constituted a traditional public forum, and therefore that the city could not reject the religious
group’s proposed monument when it had previously allowed construction of a monument
associated with another religion. Id. at 466. The Supreme Court in Pleasant Grove held that “public
forum principles . . . are out of place” in the context of displaying donated monuments in a public
park, due to scarcity of space available in parks for such permanent displays. Id. at 479–80.
Campbell responds by relying on the Knight court’s analysis, which rejected the analogy
to Pleasant Grove. The Knight court held that posting comments in the interactive space of a
Twitter account is analogous to the idea of public parks accommodating a large number of
speakers, to which the “limited space” exception In Pleasant Grove does not apply. This Court
finds this rationale persuasive.
Further, to the extent Reisch argues that she might reasonably decide that no Twitter
account is better than one open to profane, racist, or obnoxious content, such viewpoint-neutral
restrictions are not at issue in this case. With all reasonable inferences drawn in Campbell’s favor
for purposes of this motion, he properly alleged that blocking amounts to a viewpoint-based
restriction. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 575.
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d. The Court need not address whether Defendant’s actions amounted to Plaintiff’s
exclusion from the public forum.
Reisch also argues that Campbell has not been fully excluded from the interactive space,
because although he cannot respond directly to Reisch’s tweets, he can respond to other users’
commentary following Reisch’s tweets. As Campbell correctly argues, whether or not this
limitation actually amounts to a restriction violative of his First Amendment rights is not a proper
inquiry for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the Court need not address this argument.
2. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendant acted under the color of state law.
Reisch also argues that Campbell insufficiently alleged the second element of his § 1983
claim – that she was acting under the color of state law. Reisch argues that (i) she does not operate
her account on behalf of the State and (ii) blocking a Twitter account is not an exercise of state
power. Campbell asks the Court to rely on the analysis in Knight, where the court addressed the
issue of state action together with the public forum analysis, concluding that “[b]ecause facilities
or locations deemed to be public forums are usually operated by governments, determining that a
particular facility or location is a public forum usually suffices to render the challenged action
taken there to be state action subject to First Amendment limitations.”
Section 1983’s “under color of state law” requirement has consistently been treated as
equivalent to the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement. United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
To determine whether an official is acting under the color of law, courts “look to see
whether a sufficient nexus exists between the official’s public position and the official’s harmful
conduct.” Ramirez–Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir. 2009). “This nexus inquiry is
necessarily fact intensive . . . .” Id. at 901. “[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of
state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to
9
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state law.” Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213, 1215 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The [color of law] element is satisfied if the defendant acts or purports to act in the performance
of official duties, even if he oversteps his authority and misuses power.” Johnson v. Phillips, 664
F.3d 232, 240 (8th Cir. 2011). Purely personal pursuit is not attributable to the state. Screws v.
U.S., 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
The Court finds instructive the analysis on this issue in a recent decision of the Fourth
Circuit in Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019). In that case, defendant Phyllis Randall,
who served as the Chair of the Loundoun County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors created and
administered a Facebook Page “Chair Phyllis J. Randall” (“Page”). Id. at 673. One of her
constituents, Brian Davison, similarly brought a § 1983 claim, asserting that Randall’s banning
him from the Page violated his free speech rights. Id.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that Randall acted under
color of state law based on the following findings: that Randall created and administered the Page
“to further her duties as a municipal official,” because she used the Page “as a tool of governance,”
by “provid[ing] information to the public about her and the Loudoun Board’s official activities
and soliciting input from the public on policy issues she and the Loudoun Board confront,” such
as “inform[ing] the public about serious public safety events,” “keep[ing] her constituents abreast
of the County’s response to a snowstorm and to coordinate snow removal activities.” Id. at 680
(citing Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 713). The Fourth Circuit also quoted favorably the district
court’s findings that Randall:
swathe[d] the [Page] in the trappings of her office. Among other things, (1) the title
of the page includes [her] title; (2) the page is categorized as that of a government
official; (3) the page lists as contact information [her] official County email address
and the telephone number of [her] County office; (4) the page includes the web
address of [her] official County website; (5) many—perhaps most—of the posts are
expressly addressed to “Loudoun,” [her] constituents; (6) [she] has submitted posts
on behalf of the [Loudoun Board] as a whole; (7) [she] has asked her constituents
10
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to use the [Page] as a channel for “back and forth constituent conversations”; and
(8) the content posted has a strong tendency toward matters related to [her] office.
Id. at 680-81 (citing Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 714). The Fourth Circuit concluded that “Randall
clothed the . . . Page in the power and prestige of her state office, and created and administered the
page to perform actual or apparent duties of her office.” Id. at 681 (citations, internal quotation
marks, and brackets omitted).
In this case, similarly, Campbell’s allegations and reasonable inferences from them are
sufficient to plead that Reisch acted under color of state law. Campbell alleges that Reisch uses
her Account under the handle of @CheriMO44 “to address her constituents, tout her
accomplishments as a state representative, and promote her political agenda,” “to engage in
political discourse related to her official duties as a state representative” and “open[] her account
to comment by the general public.” In the Court’s view, these allegations are sufficient to plead
that Reisch acted under the color of state law.
To the extent Reisch argues that Campbell’s complaint fails to allege that the blocking of
Campbell was done in the “exercise of [a] right or privilege created by the State,” and thus under
the color of state law, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), the Court disagrees.
In addressing this argument, the Court again relies on the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in
Davison, 912 F.3d 666, which held that the specific actions of banning Davison “[we]re linked to
events which arose out of [Randall’s] official status” and that “the district court correctly held that
Randall acted under color of state law in banning Davison from the [Page].” Id. at 681 (citation
omitted). In arriving at this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that Randall’s post to the
Page prompting Davison’s comment “informed the public about what happened at the Loudoun
Board and Loudoun County School Board’s joint meeting[,]” and that “Davison’s comment also
dealt with an issue related to that meeting and of significant public interest—School Board
11
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members’ alleged conflicts of interest in approving financial transactions.” Id. The court further
stated that “Randall’s ban of Davison amounted to an effort to suppress speech critical of such
members’ conduct of their official duties or fitness for public office, which further reinforces that
the ban was taken under color of state law.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
In this case, from Campbell’s allegations that Reisch tweeted about her appearance at a
public event and questioned the patriotism of her political opponent, Maren Jones, it is reasonable
to infer that she attended the public event and tweet about her political opponent in her capacity as
a public official. Thus, Campbell’s allegations create a reasonable inference that by blocking
Campbell in response to his criticism of her tweet regarding her opponent following her
appearance at a public event, Reisch was acting under the color of state law. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. #9) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 8, 2019
/s/ Brian C. Wimes
JUDGE BRIAN C. WIMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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